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This article highlights the weakening of the EU’s transformative capacity in the broader 
European periphery in a rapidly shifting global order, with reference to Hungary and 
Turkey. Although Hungary is an ‘insider’ and Turkey a relative ‘outsider’, their recent 
experiences display strikingly similar patterns, raising important concerns about the EU’s 
leverage. Under the influence of strong nationalist-populist leaders backed by powerful 
majorities, both countries have been moving in an increasingly illiberal direction, away 
from well-established EU norms. The article proposes an analytical framework based on 
a combination of push and pull factors that are driven from changing global political 
economy dynamics, which explains the EU’s declining appeal in its periphery, not only 
in reference to the internal dynamics of European integration and its multiple crises, but 
also the appeal of illiberal versions of strategic capitalism employed by rising powers, 
which serve as reference point for the elites of several states in diverse geographical 
settings. 
Keywords: EU and broader Europe, transformative power, illiberal democracy, global 
shifts, strategic capitalism, Hungary, Turkey 
 
 
In his speech at the dawn of the third millennium, Romano Prodi (2000), then president 
of the European Commission, claimed that the ‘[EU has] forged a model of development 
and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity, 
and it is a model that works’. Indeed, the EU entered the twenty-first century with 
remarkable achievements. The launch of the euro, the big-bang enlargement towards 
post-communist countries, and expanding neighbourhood policies in Europe’s outer 
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periphery solidified its position as a sui generis power in international politics (Leonard 
2005; Reid 2005). The EU became a centre of attraction for countries in its inner and 
outer periphery in their quest to construct a liberal democracy and a market economy 
(Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). Recently, however, the 
situation changed dramatically. The euro’s devastating crisis, the weakening of the liberal 
democratic ethos in member countries following the spectacular rise of Eurosceptic 
nationalist-populist parties, and foreign policy failures vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern and 
Ukrainian crises cast growing doubts on the EU’s standard-setting capabilities in regional 
and global governance (Phinnemore 2015; Menon 2014; Whitman and Juncos 2014). 
Finally, the ‘Brexit’ vote may also have dramatic implications for the future of the 
European integration project (Niblett 2015). The EU model is clearly not working as 
originally envisaged by the European elites, since the EU finds itself in a stalemate in its 
response to new challenges. Considering this dramatic shift, we will address two critical 
questions: How do the recent multiple crises impact the EU’s transformative power over 
its inner and outer periphery? What accounts for the EU’s declining appeal and rising 
illiberal practices in several member and candidate countries? 
 Our objective is to make two main contributions to the literature. First, as 
Zielonka (2014) points out, we have various theories of European integration, but no 
comparable analytical frameworks to account for disintegration or the dynamics of a 
progressively fragmented Europe. The dominant literature mainly deals with the 
achievements and limitations of EU conditionality (Börzel 2000; Graziano and Vink 
2006). An extensive body of research deals with the mechanisms through which 
conditionality works in the EU’s relations with target countries. Both interest-based 
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rationalist perspectives (Börzel and Risse 2000) and norm-based constructivist accounts 
concentrating on the diffusion of ideas (Christiansen, Jørgensen, and Wiener 1999; 
Börzel and Risse 2009) offer compelling explanations for the EU’s policy, political, and 
polity impact on member and candidate countries. Beyond the extended versions of 
‘goodness of fit’ arguments, alternative approaches put domestic ‘preferences and 
beliefs’ at the forefront (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006; Alpan and Diez 2014). These 
perspectives’ analytical utility notwithstanding, given recent global political 
developments, it appears that these approaches do not put any particular emphasis on the 
global political economy mechanisms of the EU’s declining appeal on third countries due 
to the inadequate attention they give to the international order’s changing dynamics 
(Vollaard 2014; Webber 2014). Considering this conceptual and empirical lacuna, we 
offer a global political economy perspective that complements the existing literature by 
adding the mutually inclusive interaction of European-level dynamics and global 
transformations based on a push-and-pull framework. The first part sketches the details of 
the proposed framework; the second applies it to the Hungarian and Turkish cases. The 
third offers a comparative analysis of democratic regression in both countries, and the 
final part concludes the article.  
The Push-and-Pull Model of the EU’s Declining Transformative Power 
The 2008 global financial crisis represents a watershed in the political economy of 
contemporary capitalism (Krugman 2012; Helleiner 2010). The crisis was not the first 
shock that the world economy experienced in the neoliberal era, but it was certainly the 
most devastating one since the Great Depression. Contrary to previous economic crises 
during the 1990s and early 2000s in the global periphery, the recent financial crisis 
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erupted at the centre of global capitalism (Öniş and Güven 2011). The sub-prime crisis in 
the US economy affected the European economies more deeply than any other corner of 
the world. In the short term, the crisis spread throughout the transatlantic economies, the 
bedrock of free market economy and liberal democracy. What is important here is that 
the global crisis led to the bifurcation of global governance along the lines of liberal 
market economies and models of state-led strategic capitalism, both accompanied by a 
distinct set of political institutions (Ikenberry 2010; Kagan 2008). The increasing fluidity 
and disorder in global governance paved the way for the emergence of a new set of push 
as well as pull factors, which dramatically undermined the EU’s transformative influence.  
 
Push Factors  
The EU’s declining appeal is closely associated with the ‘multiple crises of the Union’. 
These started with the identity crisis of the early and mid-2000s due to the constitutional 
stalemate, continued with the economic and financial crises of post-2008 and culminated 
in the refugee crises, which gathered momentum in early 2015. Added to these are 
security threats due to consecutive terrorist attacks in several EU countries. The growing 
sense of insecurity within the EU embodies several critical political implications.  
 The push factors weakening the EU’s transformative capacity have two 
interrelated dimensions. The first is correlated with the poor economic performance that 
has led to unfulfilled promises of the European project, especially after 2008. Most 
commentators and policymakers agree that the euro crisis is the most compelling 
challenge in the history of European integration (Zielonka 2014; Matthijs and Blyth 
2015). When first launched, the euro project was conceived not only as an economic 
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instrument to deepen a single market and to position the euro as alternative reserve 
currency vis-à-vis the US dollar, but it was also perceived as a strong leverage to 
consolidate European political identity and solidarity. Furthermore, economic benefits 
had been utilized as strong incentive tools that underpinned the effectiveness of EU 
conditionality on target countries. 
 The management of the crisis, however, has undermined the economic 
attractiveness of the European project. In the initial phases, the core European countries, 
notably Germany, framed Southern Europe’s crisis as the outcome of irresponsible 
domestic policies and urged, for instance, Greek leaders to rely on their own means to 
deal with it. Conversely, countries in the periphery accused the European core of 
remaining ignorant of the crisis’s systemic nature that stemmed from the euro area’s 
institutional flawed fundamentals, triggering a vicious cycle of ‘blame games’ (Hall 
2012). Once it became apparent that Southern European countries had neither the 
capacity nor the resources to halt the crisis, the German-led troika (European 
Commission, European Central Bank, IMF) programmes were put into implementation, a 
step considered too little too late and insufficient to fix the euro’s structural problems 
(Jones 2015).  
 The EU’s flawed crisis management strategy had devastating consequences for 
the EU’s economic might and political cohesion. The prioritization of excessive austerity 
packages by core member states eroded the social fabric of crisis-ridden EU members 
and amplified the ‘peripheralization of southern countries’ (Gambarotto and Solari 2015). 
The manner in which the EU dealt with the euro crisis also represented a powerful blow 
to the very notion of democracy (Watkins 2012). Indeed, the replacement of elected 
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politicians with appointed technocratic governments in Greece and Italy struck a sensitive 
nerve and further aggravated the ‘democratic deficit’ debates (Matthijs 2014: 102). The 
public opinions in these countries increasingly questioned the EU’s solidarity ethos, as 
they felt punished by core members and EU institutions, leading to a growing sense of 
alienation. The crisis, in turn, consolidated the core–periphery divide in the EU. Central 
and Eastern European countries and Southern European members felt themselves pushed 
progressively further into the periphery (Bonatti and Fracasso 2013). As Jones (2015) put 
it, the European crisis was ‘over-determined’, and inadequate analysis of the problems’ 
multiple and interlinked nature resulted in Europe’s ‘muddling through’ (Blyth 2013). 
Furthermore, the EU’s inability to ensure economic recovery and the sluggish growth 
rates after 2008 decreased the appeal of the EU as a source of wealth and prosperity. For 
instance, the average growth rate in 2010–14 remained 1 per cent in the EU and 0.7 in the 
euro zone, which in turn decreased its role in shaping the preferences of member and 
candidate countries, especially for those in the European periphery.  
 The second dimension of the EU’s weakening transformative power concerns the 
crisis of internal solidarity, which gradually amplified problems with the credibility of its 
commitment and the EU’s normative paradoxes. It has long been claimed that the EU is a 
distinct actor in international relations, thanks to its ‘normative power’. Without 
necessarily resorting to hard-power instruments, the ‘EU’s ability to shape conceptions of 
normal in international relations’ constitutes its main competitive advantage (Manners 
2001: 239; Kagan 2003). The EU’s primary norms include peace, liberty, democracy, 
rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is supposed to 
place these principles at the core of its relations with third countries and to help transform 
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the domestic policies of target countries in line with them (Diez 2005). The coherently 
implemented principle-based conditionality as part of enlargement, neighbourhood, trade 
and development policies and the material incentives it provides in return create the main 
mechanisms through which the EU exerts influence and legitimacy in global politics 
(Menon (2014: 13).  
 But the EU did not fare well in terms of internal solidarity in the aftermath of the 
euro crisis that led to the amplifying normative paradoxes. Two main examples illustrate 
the case in point. The first concerns the EU’s disappointing approach to the ‘Arab 
Spring’. Beforehand, its stance towards Middle Eastern countries had been formed 
around unspoken assumptions about the national sovereignty of inherently authoritarian 
states (Hollis 2012). The EU tried to gather as much support as possible from deeply 
authoritarian regimes in Syria, Libya and Egypt, in terms of controlling illegal migration 
and countering radicalism at home. Moreover, the EU encouraged these countries to 
liberalize their markets and sustain bilateral trade relations (Grant 2011: 4). In return for 
economic benefits and better protection against illegal migration and radicalism, the EU 
refrained from issuing sharp statements on the exceptionally poor democratization and 
human rights records there (Tocci and Cassarino 2011). These over-pragmatic EU 
policies were heavily criticized following the Arab uprisings. Stefan Füle (2011), then 
European commissioner for enlargement and european neighbourhood policy, even felt 
obliged to make a self-critical statement: 
 
First, we must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in 
defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us 
fell prey to the assumption [that those] authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of 
stability in the region. This was not even Realpolitik. It was, at best, short-
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termism – and the kind of short-termism that makes the long term ever more 
difficult to build. 
 
The EU appeared to undergo a paradigm change immediately after the Arab uprisings. 
The EU member states sided with popular movements against authoritarian regimes, 
implemented a comprehensive aid package promoting democratization and pro-
democracy forces, and launched new policies (Dinçer and Kutlay 2013: 423-424). The 
picture, however, dramatically changed once the Muslim Brotherhood gained a popular 
victory in Egypt’s first democratic elections. The rise of political Islam in Egypt, 
combined with the policy mistakes of the recently elected Morsi government, led to 
scepticism among the EU members, as a result of which the EU failed to adopt a coherent 
approach in confronting Sisi’s military coup in 2013. The crisis of internal solidarity 
among member states and, therefore, diverging policy responses in Egypt, Libya and 
Syria paved the wave for widespread suspicion about the EU’s intentions, capabilities, 
and commitment to democratization beyond its own borders (Hollis 2012). 
 The second crucial test for the EU’s internal solidarity, which also seems to 
contribute to the illiberal turn in its periphery, relates to the 2015 refugee crisis and the 
EU’s relatively inept response to the unfolding humanitarian crisis. The EU for a long 
time remained virtually silent on the Syrian civil war and stayed on the sidelines until 
refugees started pouring into Europe in early 2015. Although the serious nature of the 
problem was henceforth recognized, the EU still failed to develop a comprehensive plan 
to stem the flow of migrants. Due to acute collective action problems among the member 
states and the EU’s inability to address the challenge at the supra-national level, member 
states and neighbouring countries tried to deal with the issue via unilateral policies. 
Hungary decided to ‘build a fence along its borders with Serbia’ (Keating 2015); and 
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Poland’s conservative government refused to receive any migrants as part of the EU’s 
refugee resettlement programme, since ‘the situation had changed [after the Paris 
attacks]’ (Newton 2015).  
 The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, adopted a relatively liberal stance more 
compatible with EU norms and values, being increasingly isolated at home and in Europe 
(Smale 2016). The EU’s weak internal solidarity and hazy approach in tackling the 
refugee crisis brings two major consequences regarding its appeal. Domestically, it 
created disappointment, especially among recent members. As Krastev (2015) points out, 
‘many Eastern Europeans feel betrayed by their hope that joining the EU would mean the 
beginning of prosperity and an end to crisis’. Externally, narrowly constructed interest-
based refugee policies undermined the EU’s image as promoter of human rights. This, in 
turn, created ample opportunity for nationalist-populist leaders in the periphery to exploit 
the EU’s crumbling internal solidarity to further their political agenda at home. 
 
Pull Factors 
The EU’s multiple crises and inability to respond adequately to contemporary challenges 
are not the only mechanisms leading to substantial change in the EU’s relations with 
countries in the periphery. We argue that the pull factors associated with the political 
economy of the changing global order and the rising powers in the post-crisis equilibrium 
are equally important. Two main factors deserve particular emphasis here.  
 First, after 2008 we observed not only a disappointing performance by liberal 
market economies and liberal democracy, but also a spectacular rise of non-Western 
political economy models – the most striking being China. China’s transformation has 
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sparked a lively discussion about the dynamics, nature and consequences of a possible 
move from a Western-centred to a multi-polar global order (Walt 2011; Kupchan 2012). 
There exists a quasi consensus that the world has entered a post-American era, triggered 
by the 2008 global financial crisis. The crisis galvanized debates about alternative modes 
of economic governance as the pendulum of economic thinking began to swing away 
from the neoliberalism promoted primarily by Western countries and institutions 
(Williams 2014). Indeed, it accelerated the very pace of global transformations, with 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, with China as dominant actor) 
and near-BRICS countries (such as Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Korea) 
consolidating their place as new centres of global economic activity. The high growth 
rates of emerging powers in comparison to the US’s weak recovery and the EU’s 
deepening crisis have accelerated the ‘West vs. the rest’ debate (Ferguson 2011). With 
the ascendance of non-Western powers, rival economic governance models compete with 
each other; it appears that ‘strategic capitalism’ has gained the upper hand over the 
Anglo-Saxon and social market variants of Western-style liberal governance. Following 
the crisis, the rising powers have become engines of global growth in a world of sluggish 
European economic performance. BRICS grew 5 per cent annually, China being the 
locomotive with 8.6. BRICS also became new economic actors in a world economy 
including Europe’s periphery, through large-scale investment projects and trade 
opportunities. The hallmarks of strategic capitalism, however, exceed growth 
performance (Economist 2012). Accordingly, the neo-mercantilist and post-Listian 
investment and trade policies constitute the backbone of strategic capitalist models 
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(Gerard 2014). Bremmer (2010) suggests that strategic capitalism fundamentally differs 
from free market capitalism in two ways.  
First, policymakers do not approach state intervention as a temporary 
phenomenon to jump-start the economy after a recession. Rather, they consider it a 
strategic choice to design long-term economic strategy. Second, strategic capitalists think 
that, rather than being an end in itself to expand individuals’ opportunities, markets are 
primarily ‘tools that serve national interests, or at least those of ruling elites’ (Bremmer 
2010, 250). China, in particular, promotes controlled foreign direct investment (FDI) 
policies that encourage the transfer of technology by foreign companies and selective 
state intervention in production, import and export sectors (Gerard 2011). Rather than 
leaving resource allocation mechanisms to the market’s ‘invisible hand’, strategic 
capitalist models promote the state’s active involvement to regulate resource allocation, 
especially in high-value-added industries, as in the case of China, and geo-economically 
strategic sectors such as energy, as in the case of Russia.  
 Second, strategic capitalist models offer distinct political systems in comparison 
to liberal democratic European models. As Diamond (2015) suggests, the world is now 
‘facing the recession of liberal democracy’. Accordingly, illiberal democracy practices 
are on the rise everywhere (Youngs 2015). In an era of intense anxiety and uncertainty, 
charismatic leadership and strong governments are perceived as the safest route to power 
and prosperity, while consensus-based pluralist politics is increasingly equated with the 
fragmentation and dilution of national power. The alleged success of the strategic 
capitalist models that rely on illiberal practices – promoting majoritarianism rather than 
pluralism through a rather narrow understanding of democracy – in the most influential 
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rising powers create demonstration effects elsewhere, particularly for emerging middle 
powers aspiring to punch above their weight. In a period when democratic efficacy, self-
confidence and economic dynamism recedes in Europe, the enviable growth performance 
of illiberal regimes turns into a source of admiration for elites who increasingly look to 
the East as a reference point for future economic and political development (Öniş 2016a). 
This admiration, then, influences alliance patterns and role model perceptions of various 
countries (Bader, Gravinghold, and Kastner 2010). Not surprisingly, authoritarian 
BRICS, such as Russia and China, emerge as the most visible role models, even for 
countries located within the EU’s sphere of influence (Nathan 2015; Gat 2007).  
The increasing investment and trade opportunities that authoritarian emerging 
powers provide constitute another incentive for countries in Europe’s periphery to enter 
into these states’ sphere of influence. Recently, authoritarian BRICS, particularly China, 
have become important investment and trade partners for several countries in Europe’s 
periphery (Corre and Sepulchre 2016). What makes strategic capitalism models more 
attractive to recipient countries is that economic incentives and credit opportunities are 
not tied to democratic conditionality principles advocated by the EU. As a cautionary 
note, drawing from ample evidence, one may suggest here that the sustainability of 
illiberal regimes’ economic growth performance under extractive institutions is highly 
dubious (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2002; Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012). Yet 
these arguments do not seem to have an immediate practical impact in the current global 
context, as long as strategic models of capitalism continue to exhibit success and offer 
new opportunities for other rising states.  Figure 1 summarizes the push-and-pull model. 
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Figure 1 
The Political Economy of EU’s Declining Transformative Capacity 
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Crisis in the European Periphery: Hungary and Turkey in Perspective  
In this section, we apply the push-and-pull framework to the Hungarian and Turkish 
cases as striking representatives of the EU’s declining appeal in its inner and outer 
periphery, respectively. Both countries experienced significant institutional 
transformation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, resulting in Hungary’s membership in 
2004 and Turkey’s negotiating candidate status in 2005. The EU exerted massive 
influence and played an anchor role in these two states thanks to the material incentives it 
offered in return for political and economic conditionality. In comparison to other 
alternatives, the liberal political economy model that the EU advocated also emerged as a 
key norm-setter for these countries in their quest to wealth and prosperity. The reversing 
fortunes of Hungary and Turkey are equally striking, as both recently turned towards 
illiberal practices and experienced a sharp decline in reform performance. How can we 
explain the dramatic shift in the EU’s appeal in these member and candidate countries? 
What accounts for their swift de-Europeanization?  
 
Hungary: De-Europeanization and the Illiberal Turn in a ‘Natural Insider’ 
The economic and political reforms that occurred in Hungary as part of the great Central 
and Eastern European transformation in line with liberal principles constituted one of the 
EU’s major achievements (Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). 
Thanks to the EU anchor, the tug of war between liberal and authoritarian/nationalist 
parties after the collapse of the communist regimes ended in favour of the former, as the 
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conditional membership incentive solidified democracy and rule of law. As Körösenyi 
(1999: 152) points out, in Hungary a comprehensive programme was implemented ‘for 
limiting the state; separating the branches of power; depoliticizing the economy and the 
public administration; protecting individual freedoms and creating a constitutional state; 
as well as creating a market capitalist economy’.  
 The situation dramatically changed following the election of the centre-right 
Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) under Viktor Orban. Fidesz won 52.7 per cent of 
the vote in the 2010 parliamentary elections, allowing the party to control two-thirds of 
the supermajority in parliament. Prime Minister Orban introduced a new constitution, 
‘drafted by a small group within Fidesz, and no wide public discussion ensued’ (Kornai 
2015: 4; Ágh 2016). European institutions criticized the constitution, and domestic 
opposition forces launched massive popular protests, arguing that it shrank the liberal 
democratic space, destroyed the checks and balance systems, and curtailed fundamental 
rights and freedoms (Batory 2016: 294-297). Relying on an increasingly nationalist-
populist rhetoric, Orban also changed electoral law, weakened the constitutional court’s 
independence, jeopardized the status of competition authority, targeted the central bank’s 
autonomy and the private property regime, and curtailed media and academic freedoms to 
entrench power in his hands (Kornai 2015; Jenne and Mudde 2012: 147-151; Ágh 2016). 
Orban succeeded in consolidating his power-base in the 2014 parliamentary elections by 
controlling two-thirds of the seats, despite his vote share declining to 45 per cent. Relying 
on his electoral success, Orban seemed to feel unrestricted in his policymaking and 
confident about confronting EU criticism. The consolidation of the Hungarian regime’s 
illiberal nature continues, while the EU’s anchor role seems to decline steadily. This 
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sharp reversal of the EU’s impact on the Hungarian political economy can be explained 
using our push-and-pull framework.  
 First, the EU’s declining appeal in Hungary is correlated with the worsening 
economic conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, reflecting the collateral damage of 
the euro debacle’s poor management. The crisis and the way in which the EU handled it 
created enormous distress in Europe’s periphery, as harsh austerity measures triggered 
populist-nationalist sentiments. Post-communist Hungary was among the first to 
eliminate capital controls and privatize its economy in line with European regulations 
(Csaba 2012; Csaba 2013). Having made EU membership a key goal, Hungarian 
governments strove hard to integrate the country’s financial sector and economy with 
European markets. After several liberalization waves, the Hungarian economy became 
dependent on foreign capital flows to sustain growth. Bohle (2014) calculates that 82 per 
cent of Hungarian bank assets were in the accounts of foreign banks headquartered in 
other EU states. Inevitably, the sudden halt in international capital flows following the 
euro crisis led to the Hungarian economy’s collapse. Confronted with a deep crisis, the 
incumbent socialist government had no option but to accept a loan from the IMF, the EU 
and the World Bank to halt the domestic currency’s slide. However, the EU and IMF’s 
harsh conditions did not improve the economic situation; rather, the EU-led policies 
further worsened the economic slump (Csaba 2013: 159-160). Consequently, Hungarians 
were deeply disappointed.  
 Neoliberal reforms and European integration were meant to bring unprecedented 
prosperity to Hungary. Yet, the euro crisis dashed these high expectations. Furthermore, 
it eroded the solidarity ethos within the EU, as the centre–periphery dichotomy emerged 
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abruptly. In a post-crisis survey, the Pew Research Center found that ‘72 percent of the 
respondents thought that they were worse of economically than under communism’ 
(quoted in Batory 2016: 291). Among Hungarians, the EU’s poor crisis management and 
the ‘dictates of the EU technocrats’ led to a wave of distrust and anger toward the EU 
institutions, which Orban’s government was quick to exploit. In one of his speeches, 
Orban lambasted EU interventions, declaring that Hungary ‘will not be a colony [of the 
EU]’ and ‘Hungarians will not live as foreigners dictate, will not give up their 
independence or their freedom’ (Traynor 2012). Orban’s government thus exploited the 
majoritarian understanding of democracy and expanded its popularity by questioning the 
EU’s ‘democratic deficit’. In a speech dismissing the European Commission’s criticism, 
Orban stated: ‘I was elected; the Hungarian government was also elected; as well as the 
European Parliament … But who elected the European Commission? What is its 
democratic legitimacy? And to whom is the European Parliament responsible? This is a 
very serious problem in the new European architecture’ (quoted in Jenne and Muddle 
2012: 149). 
 Second, the EU’s declining power over Hungary stems from its own crisis of 
internal solidarity in the eyes of the Hungarians; this provides ample opportunity for 
nationalist populism to dominate the domestic political space. Since collective action 
problems could not be overcome at the supra-national level, member states tried to 
develop their own solutions, which turned out to be beggar-thy-neighbour policies. Faced 
with a massive influx of migrants that boosted fear and anxiety, each member state tried 
to externalize the refugee crisis; consequently, peripheral countries felt themselves left 
out in the cold. This, in turn, exacerbated already rising Eurosceptic feelings and opened 
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more space for nationalist-populist leaders. Orban (2015), for instance, claimed that ‘we 
are expecting a solution from Brussels, which will never come … Everything is now 
happening in an uncontrolled fashion.’ He also criticized EU policies for being 
‘misguided’, as they ‘threaten to have explosive consequences’ (Orban 2015).  
Pull factors should also be taken into consideration to explain Hungary’s drift 
away from liberal European principles and norms. The increasing appeal of the rising 
powers in the global political economy and the emergence of illiberal regimes deserve 
particular attention. Orban (2014) stated this rather bluntly: ‘I don’t think that our EU 
membership precludes us from building an illiberal new state based on national 
foundations.’ Orban (2014) even claimed that ‘the era of liberal democracy is over’ and 
announced the formation of a parliamentary committee to monitor ‘foreigners who try to 
gain influence in Hungary’. He then pointed out Russia, Turkey and China as examples 
of ‘successful nations, none of which is liberal and some of which aren’t even 
democracies’. Models of strategic capitalism appear to have become a credible alternative 
for Hungarian decision-makers wishing to revitalize economic growth. Not only the 
demonstrative effects, but also the material opportunities provided by authoritarian rising 
states have gained practical relevance. Russia’s role is critical in this regard. Since his 
admission to premiership, Orban concluded lucrative economic deals with Putin. For 
instance, in 2015 Hungary signed a contract with Russia to build a 12.5 billion euro 
nuclear power plant, which attracted the EU’s criticism, but was not cancelled (Bryne and 
Oliver 2015).  
 Moreover, Orban opted for unorthodox state-led policies resembling strategic 
capitalism, especially in the finance and banking sectors, a set of policies that BRICS 
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countries have been implementing for some time. First, Orban made it clear that he did 
not want to renew the stand-by agreement with the IMF and challenged EU financial 
bodies to ‘protect the Hungarian national sovereignty’ (Johnson and Barnes 2014: 15; 
Csaba 2013, 159). The Hungarian government fully repaid its debt to the IMF, which 
shut down its long-standing representative office in Hungary. Second, Orban’s 
government increased its pressure on the central bank’s independent monetary policy and 
criticized its governor for not cutting interest rates fast enough. Finally, in March 2013, 
Orban replaced the central bank’s governor with one of his close aides, who then fired 
multiple staffers who opposed Orban’s interventionist policies (Johnson and Barnes 
2014: 14-15). Third, Orban adopted policies to increase state control over the domestic 
economy by reducing the weight of foreign banks in the Hungarian financial sector. To 
this end, he levied flat taxes directly targeting foreign banks and pursued punishment 
policies against them. The state-led unconventional policies of Orban’s government were 
a reaction to neoliberal policies along the lines of strategic capitalist models. The striking 
point is that Orban’s economic policies ‘did achieve many of the orthodox economic 
goals that previous governments have failed to attain’ (Johnson and Barnes 2014: 17; 
Csaba 2013). His unorthodox policies’ success, in turn, enhanced the legitimacy of, and 
Orban’s ambitions for, the Hungarian illiberal regime in the making. 
 
Turkey: De-Europeanization and the Illiberal Turn in an ‘Important Outsider’ 
The evolution and dynamics of Turkey–EU relations has witnessed many ebbs and flows. 
The early 2000s were marked by the Europeanization of Turkey (Öniş 2008; Demirtaş 
2015). However, the EU-factor in the Turkish political economy started to wane after a 
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short-lived golden age, in a gradual but decisive manner (Öniş 2016b). The 2011 general 
elections turned into a watershed moment, not only for the trajectory of Turkish politics, 
but also for the way in which the EU is perceived in Turkey. Following the 2011 
elections, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party) 
obtained half of the total vote. For the first time in Turkey, a political party had won three 
successive elections (2002, 2007 and 2011), with increasing vote shares. This 
unprecedented success consolidated Erdoğan’s power as the party’s unquestioned leader. 
Consequently, domestic politics became characterized by the gradual erosion of 
institutional checks and balance mechanisms, and the country moved away from the 
previous reformist spirit (Özbudun 2014). First, important setbacks occurred in the 
realms of the freedom of expression and media independence (Freedom House, 2015). 
Second, successive reform attempts to democratize Turkey’s current constitution did not 
achieve their potential (Cengiz 2014); on the contrary, the judiciary’s independence has 
been curtailed and the politicization of legal decisions jeopardizes trust in the judicial 
system (Öniş 2015). Third, in the economic realm, the political pressures on the 
independence of the central bank and other regulatory institutions have intensified. The 
state’s role in the economy became increasingly non-transparent and seems to shift away 
from EU standards (Acemoğlu and Üçer 2015). Both the number and value of non-
transparent public procurements, for instance, reached almost 45 per cent (quoted in 
Acemoğlu and Üçer 2015: 15-16). All these developments demonstrate the EU’s 
weakened anchor role, so much so that the EU ceased to be an influential norm-setter in 
Turkish politics (Yılmaz 2015: 91). Again, the push-and-pull framework captures the 
underlying dynamics of the EU’s declining appeal.  
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 The first push factor is closely related to the reversing fortunes of the European 
and Turkish economies. The membership’s anticipated economic benefits have always 
been a key driving factor in Turkey’s EU bid. The EU member states’ economic welfare 
and the Turkish economy’s poor developmental performance played a catalyst role for 
Turkey to adjust its economy in line with European standards. Over the past decade, the 
situation started to change, however. Thanks to an uninterrupted growth performance in a 
single-digit inflation environment, the per capita wealth of average Turkish citizens 
increased from $3,500 to around $10,000 in current prices; consequently, the gap 
between the EU average and Turkey decreased from 61 to 47 per cent in a decade. 
Following the global economic crisis, when the euro area grew only 0.7 per cent in 2010–
14, Turkey managed to grow 5.4 per cent annually. Turkey’s high growth-performance 
vis-à-vis EU economies boosted the government’s confidence, so much that Erdoğan 
(2012) argued that the EU no longer represented an ideal model in terms of ‘economic 
and political stability’. Prime minister at the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu (2011) also hailed 
Turkey’s economic success and suggested that it now poses a role model for Europe, 
rather than vice versa: 
Turkey is no longer a country that waits on the doorstep of the EU and IMF for a 
couple of billion [dollars]. Turkey has turned into a country that is capable of 
aiding other countries and contributes to solving their economic problems thanks 
to the dynamism of its economy. We are not a burden to the EU; we are the cure 
[for European economies].  
 
Second, the EU’s weakening role for Turkey stems from the EU’s internal solidarity 
crisis, which resulted in normative paradoxes and reduced credibility of commitment. In 
fact, worsening Turkey–EU relations predate Europe’s economic crisis (Müftüler-Baç 
2008; Öniş 2008). Bilateral relations plunged into a stalemate following the EU’s request 
  22 
that Turkey sign the Additional Protocol in 2004. The EU asked Turkey to open its ports 
to Greek Cypriot vessels as part of its customs union with the EU, on the grounds that 
Cyprus also became an EU member following the 2004 enlargement. Turkish 
policymakers, however, claimed in a 2005 declaration that the EU did not live up to its 
promises regarding the improvement of Turkish Cypriots’ status, although they had voted 
for a solution in the referendum with a 65 per cent approval of the Annan Plan (Yaka 
2016: 152-153; Müftüler-Baç 2008). In return, the Council of the European Union 
suspended negotiations on eight chapters and decided not to provisionally close others 
until Turkey implemented the customs union fully and in a non-discriminatory manner. 
Furthermore, the EU did not allow direct trade to alleviate Northern Cyprus’s isolation 
and adopted an indifferent approach, despite pre-referendum promises to the contrary.  
 Turkish rule-makers interpreted the EU’s approach as a violation of its normative 
credentials, as Greek Cypriots were rewarded with membership, even though they had 
overwhelmingly rejected the Annan Plan. Moreover, the ‘privileged partnership’ status 
offered by core EU countries instead of full membership and adding more criteria – such 
as absorption capacity – that had not been highlighted in the acquis further decreased the 
EU’s credibility in the eyes of Turkish policymakers and public opinion alike (Aydın-
Düzgit 2006; Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit 2013). Davutoğlu (2013) openly stressed this 
point: ‘[Turkey] does not trust the EU anymore … [and] cannot any longer rely on the 
EU’s verbal promises.’ 
 The EU’s appeal over Turkey was substantially jeopardized with the Arab 
uprisings and subsequent tectonic shifts in the Middle East. The EU’s inconsistent 
approach to the Arab upheavals (Dandashly 2015) and the way in which the Turkish 
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ruling elite perceived it was a particular turning point in this regard. The apparent 
contradictions of its policy choices due to the lack of internal coherence and solidarity 
undermined the EU’s credibility in the eyes of the Turkish ruling elite. For instance, 
Erdoğan (2013) expressed his frustration in the following way: ‘The EU did not even 
gather its courage to call the military coup in Egypt a “coup”.’ According to Erdoğan 
(2013), the EU’s appeasement policies towards the Sisi regime, combined with its 
inaction in the Syrian crisis, transformed it into an ineffective foreign policy actor in the 
Middle East. He criticized the EU for remaining ‘silent about Syria [and Egypt] in such a 
region where very important events are taking place’.1  
 The refugee crisis constituted the last straw in the series of disappointments. 
Turkey has become one of the main destinations for refuges; it currently hosts more than 
2.5 million Syrians, for whom Ankara has spent almost $10 billion as of early 2016. Once 
the refugees flocked to Europe, the EU institutions and member countries’ hastily crafted 
policies – which, again, stemmed from its internal crisis of solidarity – attracted severe 
criticism of regional countries, including Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey directed two 
distinct criticisms against the EU. First, the Turkish government questioned the EU’s 
stance for its overly pragmatic approach and hesitance to allocate refugees as being in 
direct contradiction to Europe’s alleged values, norms and principles. Erdoğan (2015) 
held European countries directly responsible for ‘the death of each refugee in the 
Mediterranean’, and Davutoğlu (2015) invited Europe ‘to look in the mirror, be honest 
about what it sees in the reflection, to stop procrastinating and start assuming more than 
its fair share of the burden’. Second, the traditional supporters of Turkey’s EU 
membership, mainly left- and right-wing liberals, expressed their frustration about the EU 
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abandoning its principles for the sake of immediate Realpolitik interests (Aktar 2015). 
Europe, so the opponents maintain, is now overwhelmingly concerned with the refugee 
masses flowing over its borders, often from Turkish territory, and willing to shelve 
worries about democracy in Turkey (Aktar 2015). It is claimed that German Chancellor 
Merkel’s visit to Turkey shortly before the November 2015 election clearly strengthened 
Erdoğan’s position and lent him further credibility, despite the backsliding of the rule of 
law, fundamental rights and the freedom of media and academia (İdiz 2015). Strikingly, 
the European Commission president, Jean Claude Junker, admitted in leaked talks with 
Erdoğan dating to October 2015 that the commission’s annual progress report on Turkey 
would be held back until after the election so as not to jeopardize bilateral security 
cooperation (New Europe 2016). These developments prompted the perception among 
pro-European segments that Turkey–EU cooperation on refuges ‘is misplaced and 
illegitimate when it happens in disregard of the democratic values that the EU has long 
sought to project onto its candidates’ (Saatçioğlu 2016). 
 Not only push factors, but also the emergence of new centres of attraction and the 
pull dynamics they generate should be taken into consideration. In this sense, AKP 
leadership has been influenced by the BRICS’ more illiberal versions, for instance China 
with its outstanding economic performance. The ruling elite’s boosted confidence led 
them to pursue more assertive economic policies, blended with nationalist and centralized 
rhetoric. The increasing frequency of political interventions in the central bank’s 
functioning on the ground of protecting national interests against foreign conspirators – 
which Erdoğan named the ‘interest lobby’ – and the declining independence of regulatory 
institutions clearly illustrates this trend (Özel 2015: 3). This turn is closely related to the 
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substantial challenges to liberal democracy and market economy in Europe and the allure 
of more statist strategic capitalism models in the emerging economies. For instance, the 
Turkish president’s chief adviser repeatedly claimed that the ‘EU is a declining power 
destined to break up’ (Bulut 2014a) and implied the virtual abandonment of Turkey’s 
membership based on its growing desire to be an integral part of a shifting global order 
where China and Russia are expanding their spheres of influence (Bulut 2014b). Indeed, 
Erdoğan pronounced his desire for Turkey to abandon its long-standing EU aspirations 
and become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Berberoğlu 2013; Öniş 
and Kutlay 2013). Increasing economic linkages with Russia turned into an important 
motivation behind this shift. Despite a short interval of setback in Turkey–Russia 
relations, their trade relations skyrocketed to more than $30 billion over the last decade, 
and Turkey became an important destination for Russian investors and tourists (Öniş and 
Yılmaz 2016). Clearly, this marks a radical shift in Turkey’s orientation, echoing the 
tones of strategic capitalism blended with illiberal elements, with an emphasis on 
economic and political stability under the auspices of a strong leadership (Öniş 2016a).  
 
A Comparative Analysis 
We can identify several common elements that link the two cases. The first and most 
important common denominator appears to be a deep sense of disappointment with the 
EU. In the case of Orban’s Hungary, within the context of our model, economic factors 
play a critical role. Hungary has been deeply affected by the negative impact of the euro 
crisis. The euro crisis has also undermined the economic incentives the EU can offer to 
induce compliance with European norms. More recently, the handling of the refugee 
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crisis and the lack of a coherent approach on the part of key EU elites constituted another 
source of disenfranchisement. Although Hungary has been an EU ‘insider’ as full 
member since 2004, one could also sense that Hungary does not consider itself part of the 
real EU ‘core’. In other words, Orban effectively capitalized on the EU’s crisis of internal 
solidarity that led to the sense of marginalization.  
 In Turkey, the ‘outsider’, the sense of disappointment is even greater and has been 
very strong given that, after a promising start, the negotiation process reached a 
stalemate. The virtual breakdown of the negotiation process and the absence of any 
credible commitment to Turkey’s membership has generated a deep sense of resentment 
and triggered strong nationalist sentiments. A promise of shallow security-based 
cooperation seems to have replaced the promise of deep integration, in the context of the 
recent refugee crisis; this lacks the potential to revitalize Turkey–EU relations so as to 
enhance the EU’s leverage on Turkish domestic politics and to block the growing base of 
illiberal practices. The fact that the Turkish economy has been doing reasonably well, at a 
time when much of Europe has found itself in a deep economic crisis, has also eroded the 
material incentives that the EU used to utilize as leverage on Turkey. Furthermore, 
Turkey’s economic performance vis-à-vis Europe’s economic crisis generated over-
confidence in the minds of the Turkish leaders, who now believe that Turkey can 
accomplish its development goals without being part of a deep integration scheme. 
Parallel to the Hungarian case, the way in which the EU has handled the refugee crisis 
has also elicited widespread criticism in Turkey. The refugee issue is important in 
illustrating how Orban in Hungary and Erdoğan in Turkey have used this issue in very 
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different ways to generate a nationalistic critique to build domestic popular support and 
claim moral superiority over the EU. 
The limits of European transformative capacity in Turkey became further evident 
following the failure of the coup attempt in July 2016. The EU came under severe 
criticism from the government as well as opposition circles for its lukewarm reception of 
the massive popular reactions that helped to protect the civilian regime from a possible 
military intervention. Concerns were raised in both the US and Europe regarding the 
government’s response and the scale of the purges in the name of penalizing groups 
responsible for the attempt to overthrow the democratic regime. The concerns expressed 
in Europe were interpreted as attempts to interfere in Turkey’s domestic politics and an 
implicit endorsement of the coup, generating strong nationalist sentiments in the process. 
In the case of the US, these sentiments were even stronger given the US authorities’ 
unwillingness to extradite Gulen, who was identified as the mastermind behind the failed 
coup attempt. Without a doubt, the post-coup environment in Turkey has strengthened 
Erdoğan’s position and restricted political space for possible criticism of democratic 
malpractices in the domestic political sphere. 
 Second, in both countries there exist powerful political parties led by dominant 
and charismatic leaders who were able to capitalize on the EU’s unfulfilled promises, 
progressively deepening as a result of the EU’s multiple crises. These political parties 
also have the capacity to mobilize a large majority of the population, given the extremely 
weak and fragmented opposition parties in both countries. The resulting unbalanced 
political structures have paved the way for illiberal practices in both cases, leading to the 
erosion of the checks and balance mechanisms necessary for a well-functioning liberal 
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democracy. The EU’s weakening anchor role, combined with weak domestic opposition, 
has allowed illiberal parties to expand their power-base in Europe’s inner and outer 
periphery. Third, in both cases, mass parties led by strong nationalist-populist leaders 
increasingly look toward the East for new political economy models of development. The 
appeal of strategic capitalism associated with the authoritarian Russia–China axis – and 
Putin’s leadership style – is particularly striking. This style of capitalism promises 
economic benefits in an environment of significant concentration of political power in the 
hands of the centralized executive, in a way clearly incompatible with EU norms. 
 Beyond these commonalities, however, there are also noteworthy differences. The 
first one concerns the limits of the illiberal turn in Europe’s inner and outer periphery. 
There are limits to the extent to which Hungary, as insider, can deviate from EU norms. 
Certainly, Orban has no intention of leaving the EU and considers it crucial for 
Hungary’s long-term economic and security interests. In the case of outsider Turkey, 
however, the potential for divergence from EU norms is considerably stronger. It is a 
well-established fact that the EU’s transformative effect has historically been much 
stronger on member states or candidate countries with a credible chance of full 
membership. While the EU’s disciplining measures may become more difficult to 
implement once a country is actually an insider, the cost of exiting is nonetheless high; 
therefore, it is likely to exert a disciplinary effect and establish a certain boundary for 
actions that apply to non-compliant cases. No such mechanisms exist for countries in the 
outer periphery, which lack credible commitments towards full membership. The cost of 
non-compliance is low; hence, the likelihood of deviation from EU norms is 
correspondingly much higher, as is apparent in the Hungarian and Turkish cases. 
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 The second striking difference stems from the contrasting positions adopted with 
respect to the ongoing refugee crisis in both countries. Hungary veered to a very strong 
‘closed-door’ approach to refugees, which has been described as inhumane by the vast 
majority of the EU. In contrast, Turkey under the AKP has adopted an extreme version of 
an ‘open-door’ policy and effectively used it to build the image of a humanitarian actor, 
which also became a functional legitimization device in the sphere of domestic politics. 
Unlike Hungary, which considered the EU too lenient towards the influx of refugees, 
Turkey’s position was quite the reverse, as the Turkish ruling elite criticized the EU for 
not effectively sharing the burden and failing to admit an adequate number of refugees. 
Third, the economy constitutes a sphere where the two countries appear to have differed 
in recent years. Hungary’s economic performance has been comparatively weak, which, 
in turn, constituted a source of criticism against the EU, especially in the context of the 
euro crisis, with costly ramifications in the Hungarian case. Turkey, on the other hand, 
has been doing relatively better in the economic realm; this has been a factor in the 
argument that the EU’s incentives is perhaps no longer as critical as it was in the past, 
especially at a time when the EU itself is experiencing a major crisis that has led to a 
prolonged period of stagnation. 
 
Conclusions 
We highlighted the weakening of the EU’s transformative capacity in the broader 
European periphery in a rapidly shifting global political economy with reference to two 
critical cases. Although Hungary, as a member state, is an ‘insider’ and Turkey, as a 
candidate country, a relative ‘outsider’, their experiences in recent years display similar 
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patterns that raise important concerns regarding the EU’s political and economic appeal 
as a norm-setter. Both countries, under the influence of strong nationalist-populist leaders 
backed by powerful majorities, have been moving in an increasingly illiberal direction, 
away from the well-established EU norms and principles. That being said, the aim of this 
article is neither to discuss the domestic sources of rising illiberal tendencies in Europe’s 
periphery, nor to explain the divergence in the degree of democratic regression in these 
countries with reference to existing literature on the ‘transformative power of Europe’. 
Rather, the article specifies an analytical framework based on a combination of push and 
pull factors, which explains the declining appeal of the EU over its periphery with 
reference to the changing dynamics of global political economy. It takes into account not 
only the internal dynamics of European integration and its multiple crises, but also the 
appeal of the more authoritarian versions of strategic capitalism employed by the rising 
powers, which increasingly serves as reference point for the elites of several states in 
diverse geographical settings.  
 The Hungarian and Turkish cases highlight certain parallels between the EU’s 
declining leverage in the insider as well as outsider cases. This should not lead us to 
overlook the fact that the EU contains the potential to exercise considerably more 
leverage over insiders. The ability of countries such as Hungary to deviate from EU 
norms by a considerable margin is constrained by the fact that the EU can use the ‘exit 
option’. In contrast, the EU’s incentive structure of benefits of entry and costs of exit is 
largely inoperative in the case of a country such as Turkey, where the membership option 
lacks credibility and the threat option involving the cost of exit is largely absent. The 
strong insider vs outsider dichotomy in the EU is aptly illustrated by recent 
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developments. The EU has been concerned about illiberal practices within its existing 
borders, particularly following their spread to a larger and economically more dynamic 
member state, Poland. Indeed, the European Commission has proposed action to curb 
illiberal constitutional politics in Poland. In the Hungarian case, there have also been 
some strong reactions to Orban coming from EU institutions. These criticisms 
particularly surfaced after Hungary adopted a rather tough approach to the ongoing 
refugee crisis. In contrast, similar concerns about illiberal trends in domestic politics have 
been much more subdued in the Turkish case, as key European elites have sought 
Turkey’s active cooperation in managing the refugee crisis. Given that Turkey seems to 
be far away from membership in the foreseeable future, concerns about its domestic 
political developments appear to have been largely subordinated to the single-minded 
concern of managing the refugee crisis at all costs, thus providing a new layer of external 
legitimacy to an existing hybrid regime that is of a growing illiberal nature. 
 
Note                                                        
1 Similarly, Davutoğlu criticized the EU several times on the very same ground. See Davutoğlu (2015).  
 
 
References 
Acemoğlu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012), Why Nations Fail? (London: Penguin Books). 
 
Acemoğlu, D. and Üçer, M. (2015), The Ups and Downs of Turkish Growth, 2002-2015: 
Political Dynamics, the European Union and the Institutional Slide, NBER Working 
Paper, No. 21608, October. 
 
Ágh, A. (2016), ‘The Decline of Democracy in East-Central Europe: Hungary as a 
Worst-case Scenario’, Problems of Post-Communism, ifirst. 
 
  32 
Aktar, C. (2015), ‘AB ve Erdoğan, Hayal Dünyası’, Taraf, 17 October. 
 
Alpan, B. and Diez, T. (2014), ‘The Devil is in the ‘Domestic’? European Integration 
Studies and the Limits of Europeanization in Turkey’, Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, 16 (1): 1-10.  
 
Aydın-Düzgit, S. (2006), Seeking Kant in the EU's Relations with Turkey (İstanbul: 
TESEV Publications). 
 
Batory, A. (2016), ‘Populists in Government? Hungary’s ‘System of National 
Cooperation’’, Democratization, 23 (2): 283-303.  
 
Berberoğlu, E. (2013), ‘EU not a must for Turkey: PM Erdoğan’, Hurriyet Daily News, 6 
February.  
 
Blyth, M. (2013), Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).  
 
Bohle, D. (2014), ‘Post-Socialist Housing Meets Transnational Finance: Foreign Banks, 
Mortgage Lending, and the Privatization of Welfare in Hungary and Estonia’, Review of 
International Political Economy, 21 (4): 913-948.  
 
Bonatti, L. and Fracasso, A. (2013), ‘The German Model and the European Crisis’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 51 (6): 1023-1039.  
 
Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2000), When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and 
Domestic Change, European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 4 (15). 
 
Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2009), The Transformative Power of Europe: The European 
Union and the Diffusion of Ideas, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 1, 2009. 
 
Börzel, T. A. (2015), ‘The Noble West and the Dirty Rest? Western Democracy 
Promoters and Illiberal Regional Powers’, Democratization, 22 (3): 519-535.  
 
Bryne, A. and Oliver, C. (2015), ‘Hungary’s Russian-Built Energy Plants Rebuked’, 
Financial Times, 19 November. 
 
Bulut, Y. (2014a), ‘Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği Projesinin ‘Alternatifi’ Olabilir’, Star, 15 
January.  
 
Bulut, Y. (2014b), ‘2023 Büyük Türkiye Doktrini Yazılmaya Başlandı’, Star, 11 August.  
 
Cengiz, F. (2014), ‘The Future of Democratic Reform in Turkey: Constitutional Moment 
or Constitutional Process?’ Government and Opposition, 49 (4): 682-703. 
 
  33 
Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E., and Wiener, A. (1999), ‘The Social Construction of 
Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6 (4): 528-544. 
 
Csaba, L. (2012), ‘Hungary and the Eurozone Crisis: A Comedy of Errors?’ Yearbook of 
the Institute of East-Central Europe, 10 (5): 33-44.  
 
Csaba, L. (2013), ‘Growth, Crisis Management and the EU: The Hungarian Trilemma’, 
Mitteilungen, 53 (3): 155-169.  
 
Dandashly, A. (2015), ‘The EU Response to Regime Change in the Wake of the Arab 
Revolt: Differential Implementation’, Journal of European Integration, 37 (1): 37-56.  
 
Davutoğlu, A. (2011), ‘Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Davutoğlu’nun IV. Büyükelçiler 
Konferansı Vesilesiyle Trakya Üniversitesi’nde Yaptığı Konuşma’, speech, Trakya 
University, Edirne, 29 December, www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-iv_-buyukelciler-konferansi-vesilesiyle-trakya-universitesi-balkan-kongre-merkezi_nde.tr.mfa. 
 
Davutoğlu, A. (2013), ‘Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun Dış Ekonomik 
İlişkiler Kurulu Tarafından Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma’, speech, 
İstanbul, 9 March, www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-dis-ekonomik-iliskiler-kurulu-tarafindan-duzenlenen-toplantida-yaptiklari-konusma_-9.tr.mfa.  
 
Davutoğlu, A. (2015), ‘Başbakan Davutoğlu’nun 17 Mart Tarihli TBMM Grup 
Toplantısı’, speech, TBMM, Ankara, 17 March, www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-davutoglunun-17-mart-tarihli-tbmm-grup-toplantisi-konusmasinin-tam/72422#1. 
 
Demirtaş, B. (2015), ‘Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: A Europeanized 
Foreign Policy in a De-Europeanized National Context?’ Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, 17 (2): 123-140.  
 
Diamond, L. (2015), ‘Facing up to the Democratic Recession’, Journal of Democracy, 26 
(1): 141-155.  
 
Diez, T. (2005), ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative 
Power Europe’’, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 33 (3): 613-636.  
 
Dinçer, O. B. and Kutlay, M. (2013), ‘The Arab Spring: A Game Changer in Turkey-EU 
Relations?’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 14 (4): 418-430.  
 
Economist (2012), ‘The Rise of State Capitalism’, 21 January. 
 
  34 
Erdoğan, R. T. (2012), ‘Başbakan Erdoğan’ın 6 Kasım Tarihli TBMM Grup Toplantısı’, 
speech, TBMM, Ankara, 6 November, www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-6-kasim-tarihli-tbmm-grup-toplantisi-konusmasinin-tam-me/33218#1. 
 
Erdoğan, R. T. (2013), ‘Başbakan Erdoğan’ın 22 Ekim Tarihli TBMM Grup Toplantısı’, 
speech, TBMM, Ankara, 22 October, www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-22-ekim-tarihli-tbmm-grup-toplantisi-konusmasinin-tam-me/53477#1.  
 
Erdoğan, R. T. (2015), ‘Erdoğan: Avrupa Ölen Her Mültecinin Vebaline Ortaktır’, 
speech, 3 September, www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/09/150903_erdogan. 
 
Euronews (2016), ‘Tusk Gives the EU Two Months to Save Schengen’, Euronews, 19 
January. 
 
Gambarotto, F. and Solari, S. (2015), ‘The Peripheralization of Southern European 
Capitalism Within the EMU’, Review of International Political Economy, 22 (4): 788-
812. 
 
Gat, A. (2007), ‘The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers’, Foreign Affairs, 86: 59-69. 
 
Grant, C. (2011), A New Neighborhood Policy for the EU, CER Policy Brief, 11 March. 
 
Graziano, P. R. and Vink, M. P. (2006) (eds), Europeanization: New Research Agendas 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).  
 
Hall, P. A. (2012), ‘The Economics and Politics of the Euro Crisis’, German Politics, 21 
(4): 355-371. 
 
Helleiner, E. (2010), ‘A Bretton Woods Moment? The 2007–2008 Crisis and the Future 
of Global Finance’, International Affairs, 86 (3): 619-636. 
 
Hollis, R. (2012), ‘No Friend of Democratization: Europe’s Role in the Genesis of the 
‘Arab Spring’’, International Affairs, 88 (1): 81-94.  
 
İdiz, S. (2015), ‘Merkel’s Visit Strikes Cynical Chord in Turks’, Hurriyet Daily News, 20 
October.  
 
Ikenberry, G. J. (2010), ‘The Liberal International Order and its Discontents’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 38 (3): 509-521. 
 
Jenne, E. K. and Mudde, C. (2012), ‘Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Can Outsiders Help?’ 
Journal of Democracy, 23 (3): 147-155. 
 
Johnson, J. and Barnes, A. (2015) ‘Financial Nationalism and its International Enablers: 
The Hungarian Experience’, Review of International Political Economy, 22 (3): 535-569. 
 
  35 
Jones, E. (2015) ‘Getting the Story Right: How You Should Choose between Different 
Interpretations of the European Crisis (And Why You Should Care)’, Journal of 
European Integration, 37 (7): 817-832. 
 
Kagan, R. (2003), Of Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World Order 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf). 
 
Kagan, R. (2008), The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Knopf). 
 
Keating, J. (2015), ‘Here’s Why Eastern Europe is so much more Antagonistic to Syria’s 
Refugees than Western Europe’, The Slate, 14 September.  
 
Keyman, E. F. and Aydın-Düzgit, S. (2013) EU-Turkey Relations and the Stagnation of 
Turkish Democracy, Global Turkey in Europe, Working Paper 02.  
 
Kornai, J. (2015), ‘Hungary’s U-Turn’, Capitalism and Society, 10 (1): 1-24. 
 
Körösenyi, A. (1999), Government and Politics in Hungary (Budapest: Central European 
University Press).  
 
Krastev, I. (2015), ‘Eastern Europe’s Compassion Deficit’, New York Times, 8 
September. 
 
Krugman, P. (2012), End This Depression Now! (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company).  
 
Leonard, M. (2005), Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (London and New York: 
Fourth Estate). 
 
Manners, I. (2002), ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 40 (2): 235-258. 
 
Mastenbroek, E., Keading, M. (2006), ‘Europeanization Beyond the Goodness of Fit: 
Domestic Politics in the Forefront’, Comparative European Politics, 4 (4): 331-354. 
 
Matthijs, M. and Blyth, M. (2015), The Future of the Euro (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press).  
 
Matthijs, M. (2014), ‘Mediterranean Blues: The Crisis in Southern Europe’, Journal of 
Democracy, 25 (1): 101-115.  
 
Menon, A. (2014), ‘Divided and Declining? Europe in a Changing World’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Annual Review, 52: 5-24. 
 
Müftüler-Baç, M. (2008), ‘Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Impact of the 
EU’s Internal Dynamics’, International Studies Perspectives, 9 (2): 201-219. 
  36 
 
Nathan, A. (2015), ‘China’s challenge’, Journal of Democracy, 26 (1): 156-170. 
 
New Europe (2016), ‘Erdogan Threatened to Flood Europe with Refugees’, New Europe, 
9 February. 
 
Newton, J. (2015), ‘Poland’s New PM Says the Country will not Accept an EU Quota of 
4,500 Refugees in the Wake of the Paris Terror Attacks’, Daily Mail, 25 November.  
 
Niblett, R. (2015), Britain, Europe and the World Rethinking the UK’s Circles of 
Influence, Chatham House Research Paper, October.  
 
Öniş, Z. and Güven, A. B. (2011), ‘The Global Economic Crisis and the Future of 
Neoliberal Globalization: Rupture vs. Continuity’, Global Governance, 17 (4): 469-488. 
 
Öniş, Z. and Kutlay, M. (2013), ‘Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: Political 
Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICs’, Third World Quarterly, 34 (8): 1409-1426. 
 
Öniş, Z. (2008), ‘Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate’, Insight Turkey, 
10 (4): 35-50. 
 
Öniş, Z. (2015), ‘Monopolising the Center: The AKP and the Uncertain Path of Turkish 
Democracy’, The International Spectator, 50 (2): 22-41.  
 
Öniş, Z. (2016a), ‘Democracy in Uncertain Times: Inequality and Democratic 
Development in the Global North and Global South’, METU Studies in Development, 43 
(1): 317-336. 
 
Öniş, Z. (2016b), ‘Turkey’s Twin Elections and the AKP’s Comeback’, Journal of 
Democracy, 27 (2): 141-154.  
 
Öniş, Z. and Yılmaz, Ş. (2016), ‘Turkey and Russia in a Shifting Global Order: 
Cooperation, Conflict and Asymmetric Interdependence in a Turbulent Region’, Third 
World Quarterly, 37 (2): 71-96. 
 
Orban, V. (2014), ‘Full Text of Viktor Orban’s Speech at Baile Tuşnad’, speech, Baile 
Tuşnad, 26 July, http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/10592. 
 
Orban, V. (2015), ‘We are Protecting Europe’s Values’, 17 October, www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/we-are-protecting-europe-s-values. 
 
Özbudun, E. (2014), ‘AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan’s Majoritarian Drift’, South 
European Society and Politics, 19 (2): 155-167. 
 
  37 
Özel, I. (2015), Reverting Structural Reforms in Turkey: Towards an Illiberal Economic 
Governance? Global Turkey in Europe, Policy Brief 22, May.  
 
Phinnemore, D. (2015), ‘Crisis-Ridden, Battered and Bruised: Time to Give Up on the 
EU?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review, 53, 61-74.  
 
Prodi, R. (2000), ‘Shaping the New Europe’, speech, European Parliament, Strasbourg, 
15 February, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-41_en.htm. 
 
Reid, T. R. (2005), The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of 
American Supremacy (London: Penguin Books). 
 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F., 2002. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. NBER Working 
Paper, No. 9305, November.  
 
Saatçioğlu, B. (2016), ‘Turkey and the EU: Strategic Rapprochement in the Shadow of 
the Refugee Crisis’, E-International Relations, 21 January.  
 
Schimmelfenning, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005) (eds), The Europeanization of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Cornell: Cornell University Press).  
 
Smale, A. (2016), ‘Stance on Migrants Leaves Merkel Isolated at Home and in Europe’, 
New York Times, 22 January. 
 
Tocci, N. and Cassarino, J. (2011), Rethinking the EU’s Mediterranean Policies Post-
1/11, IAI Working Papers 1106, March.  
 
Traynor, I. (2012), ‘Hungary Prime Minister Hits Out at EU Interference in National Day 
Speech’, Guardian, 15 March. 
 
Vachudova, A. M. (2005), Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, Integration after 
Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
 
Vollaard, H. (2014), ‘Explaining European disintegration’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 52 (5): 1142–1159. 
 
Watkins, S. (2012), ‘Another Turn of the Screw’, New Left Review, 75: 5-13.  
 
Webber, D. (2014), ‘How Likely is it that the European Union will Disintegrate? A 
Critical Analysis of Competing Theoretical Perspectives’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 20 (2): 341–365. 
 
Whitman, R. G. and Juncos, A. E. (2014), ‘Challenging Events, Diminishing Influence? 
Relations with the Wider Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52: 157-169. 
 
  38 
Yaka, Ö. (2016), ‘Why not EU? Dynamics of the Changing Turkish Attitudes towards 
EU Membership’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 24 (1): 149-170.  
 
Yılmaz, G. (2015), ‘From Europeanization to De-Europeanization? The Europeanization 
Process of Turkey in 1999-2014’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 24 (1): 
86-100.  
 
Youngs, R. (2015), ‘Exploring Non-Western Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 26 (4): 
140-154.  
 
Zielonka, J. (2014), Is the EU Doomed? (London: Polity Press). 
